





In the last five years both long- and short-tenn
interest rates have reached levels not seen in U.S.
economic history since the Civil War. Yields
on long-tenn corporate bonds never exceeded 7
percent in the one hundred years before 1970 but
ratcheted steadily upward after that year, reaching
double-digit levels by 1979. Similarly, when the
yield on short-term commercial paper reached 10.9
percent in 1979, it exceeded the previous record
high which had stood since 1873.
It is generally agreed that these historically high
interest rates reflected the unusually rapid inflation
experiencedduringthe 1970s. Economic theory and
common observation suggest that both borrowers
and lenders in loan markets are influenced by the
rate ofinflation in detenniningthe rateofinterest. If
the prices of goods and services are rising at ten
percent a year and a loan is negotiated at fifteen
percent, the true cost ofthe loan to the borrower-
in terms ofpurchasing power over goods and serv-
ices-and the true return received by the lender are
only five percent. Presumably, it is this inflation-
adjusted or real rate of interest that borrowers and
lenders negotiate. If the rate of inflation were to
decline, but all the factors detennining the real in-
terest rate were to remain unchanged, the nominal
interest rate offered by borrowers and accepted by
lenders would also decline. For example, if the
inflation rate were to fall from ten percent to five
percent, the nominal rate of interest would decline
correspondinglyfrom fifteen percentto ten percent.
Empirical evidence supports these theoretical
expectations. Chart I shows the nominal yield I on
9I-day Treasury bills, the rate of inflation over
three-month spans as measured by the official con-
sumerprice index, and the realized real interestrate
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computed as the difference between these two
series.
2 From this chart, it is clearthat in the quarter-
century after 1953, variations in the nominal short-
term rate were associated closely with changes in
the rate of inflation and, thus, the real rate did not
vary much from its long-run average level ofaround
one percent.
However, Chart I also suggests that the close link
between inflation and short-tenn interest rates may
have broken down after 1979. Although the rate of
inflation declined in response to the Federal Re-
serve System's policy of slowing monetary growth
after 1979, nominal interest rates remained high.
Even after the sharp decline in rates beginning in
mid-1982, the nominal Treasury bill yield averaged
8.55 percent in December 1982. As measured by
the consumer price index, the rate of inflation dur-
ing the three-month period beginning in that month
was slightly less than one-half of one percent, so
that the real yield realized by holders ofthese bills
was just over 8 percent. From Chart I, we can see
that a real rate of 8 percent is extremely high by
historical standards.
In this article, we consider a number of factors
which economic theory and popular opinion sug-
gest may be important in determining short-term
real interest rates and examine whether they are
capable ofexplaining the recent experience ofhigh
real rates. The principal conclusion is that, at least
overthe sample period examined in this study, high
real rates appearto have been more closely linked to
monetary policy-and to expectations ofpolicy-
than to fiscal policies that have produced federal
deficits.
Focus on Short-Term Rates
Throughout our study, we focus on short-term
rather than long-term interest rates for several rea-
sons, some purely practical and others funda-mental. The principal practical reason arises from
the fact that in determining the nominal interest rate
on a financial asset. investors will take account of
the rate ofintlation which they expect to occurover
the lifeofthat asset. That is, the nominal rate will be
set so that the real rate which is expected to emerge
will adequately compensate investors for holding
the asset. However, because those intlation expec-
tations are not observable, the real rate required by
investors also is not observable.
This measurement problem, in principle, affects
both short-term and long-term securities, but may
be less serious for short-term assets. Except in per-
iods when the rate of intlation is changing rapidly,
investors should be able to predict the prices ofthe
goods and services they buy and sell over the next
three months quite accurately. The differences be-
tween predicted and realized rates of intlation
should therefore be quite small. By contrast, intla-
tion forecasting over a longer time horizon is a
much more difficult undertaking. Divergences be-
tween expected and realized intlation rates in such
long-term forecasting are therefore likely to be
larger. In other words, whereas the realized, or ex
post, real rate on short-term securities should be a
reasonably good approximation of the rate which
investors required ex ante when they acquired the
securities, the same is less likely to be true for
longer-term securities. Because of this measure-
ment problem, it is more difficult to test hypotheses
regarding the determinants of long-term real rates
than it is for those ofshort-term rates.
Traditionally, economists have argued that
changes in the financial side ofthe economy mainly
affect the real side through theireffect on long-term
interest rates. The interest-sensitive components of
aggregate demand consist primarily of residential
construction and plant and equipment spending.
Since these components represent purchases of
long-lived physical assets, economists have argued
that they should respond to changes in the yield on
long-term financial assets because this return rep-
resents the appropriate opportunity cost of funds
used to purchase such assets. This argument would
imply thatalthough hypotheses with regard to short-
term rates are easier to test, they are less important
to policy-makers than those concerned with long
rates.
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32reasons-in addition to the practical technical rea-
son discussed above-justifying this article's
emphasis on short-term rates.
The first reason is thatchanges in short-term rates
tend to be reflected in long rates. A household or
business wishing to invest its funds for a long period
may, if it wishes, hold a sequence of short-term
securities rather than a single long-term security.
Conversely, an investor wishing to invest for a short
period may purchase a long-term security and resell
it before maturity. Hence, long-term and short-term
securities are to some extent substitutes, and as a
result, their rates ofreturn tend to move together.'
A second reason for focusing on short-term rates
is that in recent years the share of short-term bor-
rowing in the total ofall funds raised in the nation's
capital markets has increased. Of the $85 billion
raised by private domestic non-financial borrowers
(excluding residential mortgages) in 1971, almost
70 percent represented corporate and municipal
bonds and non-residential mortgages. Ten years
later, the amount raised had risen to $225 billion but
the share of long-term financing had declined to 42
percent. Conversely, commercial paper, bankers'
acceptances and bank loans increased from 13 per-
cent to 46 percent of the total over this ten-year
period.
A final reason for studying short-term rates is
that, in some sense, their behavior since 1979 has
been more surprising than that of long rates. The
failure of nominal long rates to decline in line with
inflation may be explained by arguing that, al-
though the current inflation rate has declined,
investors are still worried aboutfuture inflation, so
that long-term exante real rates are not particularly
high by historical standards. Although this argu-
ment is difficult to test empiricalll because, as
noted earlier, long-term inflation expectations and
hence ex ante real rates are not observable, it is not
implausible. This argument cannot, however, be
applied to short-term rates because short-term infla-
tion rates clearly have come down substantially.
When investors set an 8.55 percent rate ofreturn on
3-month Treasury bills in December 1982, it would
have required an expected inflation rate ofclose to 7
percent for the real rate on those bills to be at its
long-run average level. The realized inflation rate
was almost zero overthe 3-month period beginning
in December 1982. It seems very unlikely that
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expectations of inflation were that far offthe mark.
Thus, it is virtually certain that the ex ante real rate
wasexceptionally high by historical standards. This
unusual behaviorrequires an explanation.
What Determines the Real InterestRate?
The real interest rate represents the return which
investors expect to earn on holdings of securities.
Each investor decides how many securities to hold
by comparing this return with that available on
alternative assets. The principal alternatives are
money, which often yields no explicit return, and
physical assets, such as business plant and equip-
ment and residential housing, which provide a re-
turn in the form ofproductive services.
Although each investor chooses how to allocate
total wealth among these various assets, in the ag-
gregate, all securities outstanding must be held.
This means that the interest rate must be such that
the entire outstanding stock ofsecurities is willingly
held by investors. The rate of interest, therefore, is
determined by the demand to hold securities andthe
available supply ofsecurities
5
Before discussing these factors in detail, one
methodological point should be mentioned. In this
paper, the interest rate is treated as being deter-
mined by the supply of and demand for securities.
As we shall see, a variety of macroeconomic vari-
ables influence these supplies and demands. But
these variables are themselves affected by the in-
terest rate. Forexample, the demand to hold securi-
ties, and hence the interest rate, is influenced by the
level ofnominal GNP. But conversely, the interest
rate affects the level of nominal GNP through its
effect on the spending decisions ofhouseholds and
businesses. In turn, the level of GNP influences
othermacroeconomic variables, such as the govern-
ment deficit, which may affect interest rates.
In a complete model ofthe economy, the interest
rate would be determined simultaneously withother
macroeconomic variables such as income, the gov-
ernment deficit, and the inflation rate. In such a
"full equilibrium" model, the level of nominal
GNP, for example, both affects and is affected by
the level of interest rates. The model used here,
however, is a "partial equilibrium" one and seeks
to explain the real interest rate in terms of other
macroeconomic variables without exploring thefeedback effects ofchanges in interest rates on those
variables.
There is ample precedent for this procedure. The
well-known IS/LM paradigm, for example, is a
complete model of the economy which determines
both the level of income and the interest rate.
Within this framework, the LM curve is essentially
a model which determines the interest rate in tem1S
of income and the IS curve describes the feedback
from the interest rate to the level of income. The
equations estimated here are analogous to the LM
eurve since the level ofincome is taken as oneofthe
determining variables. Factors influencing interest
rates via the IS curve (fiscal policy, for example) do
so through their effect on the level of income.
Within this broad framework, economists have
two ways ofapproaching the determination ofinter-
est rates: The liquidity-preference approach which
focuses attention on the decision between holding
securities and holding money, and the demand/or
capital approach which emphasizes the decision
between holding (or issuing) securities and holding
productive capital.
In the liquidity-preference approach the rate of
interest is regarded as "the reward for parting with
liquidity."" In this approach, the key characteristic
of money is that it is used to make payments so that
the demandto hold it is closely related to the level of
nominal income. But the demand for money also
depends on the opportunity cost of holding it. In
equilibrium, this opportunity cost must be such that
in the aggregate the stock of money is willingly
held. When the stock of money is willingly held,
this implies that the same is true of the stocks of
otherassets.
Until recently, money was distinguished by the
fact that it yielded no explicit return, so the cost of
holding it was simply the interest rate which could
be earned on alternative non-money assets such as
securities. This meant that the interest rate on secu-
rities had to be such that the public was willing to
hold the existing stock of money. If, for example,
the level of income were to rise with no increase in
the total stockofmoney, individual investors would
seek to increase the level of their money-holdings
by selling securities. Since all securities must be
held in the aggregate, security prices would fall and
interest rates would rise until investors stopped try-
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ing to switch out of securities into money. Con-
versely, if the level of income were to remain un-
changed and there were an increase in the supply of
money, individual investors would tend to push
down interest rates as they sought to reduce their
money holdings and to inerease their holdings of
securities.
Although the recent deregulation ofthe financial
system has eroded the unique characteristic of
money as an asset which provides no explicit return,
it remains true that the yield on monetary assets
is less flexible than that on securities. As a result,
rates on securities continue to do most ofthe adjust-
ing to equate the supplyofmoney to the demand for
money.
Whereas the liquidity preference approach em-
phasizes the choice between holding money and
holding securities, the demandforcapitalapproach
emphasizes the decision between holding produc-
tive capital and holding securities, and argues that
the nominal rate of interest on securities must be
such that wealth holders are willing to hold the
existing quantities of these two types of earning
assets. If, for example, the expected return to pro-
ductive capital rises, businesses and households
will wish to hold fewer (or issue more) securities in
order to hold more capital. Since all outstanding
securities must be held, this will tend to drive up
yields on securities.
Frequently, this argument is expressed in flow
rather than in stock terms, and the interest rate is
explained in terms of the supply of lendable funds
out of current saving relative to the demand for
funds to finance private capital formation and the
government's deficit. When the demand for funds
increases relative to the available supply, their
price, which is the interest rate, tends to rise.
The liquidity-preference and productive-capital
approaches to interest rates focus on different
aspects of the process of interest-rate determina-
tion. The liquidity preference approach emphasizes
substitutions between money and securities where-
as the capital model stresses the ehoice between
securities and physical assets. Each approach sug-
gests that certain variables will have predictable
effects on security prices and interest rates. The
variables most often considered by both economists
and market commentators are changes in the moneysupply relative to the demand, changes in the infla-
tion rate and changes in the govemment's deficit.
Consider first the effects of monetary changes,
better analyzed in terms of the liquidity preference
paradigm. An increase in the demand to hold money
with no change in the available supply puts upward
pressure on interest rates. To be more specific, the
amount of money investors want to hold depends
positively on recent levels of nominal income and
negatively on short-term interest rates. In a given
month, money demand may rise as aresultofpastor
present increases in personal income or as the de-
layed result ofpast declines in interest rates. Ifthe
supply of money does not rise to match such an
increase in demand, the current interest rate must
rise to restore equilibrium in the money market.
Conversely, if the supply of money increases by
more than the demand, interest rates will decline.
Since the stock of money is a policy variable
determined largely by the central bank, the liquidity
preference approach implies that the central bank
can make a significant impacton the general level of
nominal interest rates. A policy-induced increase in
the stock of money will, ceteris paribus, tend to
lower interest rates.
In the short run, the stock of money also may
increase as a result of a rise in the amount of com-
mercial bank lending. The public is willing to hold
this money for a short while with little orno change
in interest rates but will eventually seek to get rid of
these excess money holdings.
7 When they do so,
interest rates will tend to decline.
The effects of inflation and government deficits
on interest rates are better examined in terms ofthe
demand for capital approach since inflation affects
the nominal returns to holding productive capital
relative to those on securities, while deficits require
changes in the supply ofsecurities.
Consider first the effect ofa change in the rate of
inflation. Since wealth-owners are concerned with
the real return on their portfolios of securities, the
nominal interest rate which they require will be
equal to the real rate they demand plus the rate of
inflation they expect. Conversely, the return which
issuers ofsecurities will pay will be equal to the real
rate they offer plus the inflation rate they expect.
Hence, ifthe real rate is constant, a given change in
the rate ofinflation will cause an equal change in the
nominal rate since both lenders and borrowers will
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accept such a change.x
However, inflation also may affect the real rate
itself. In that case, a change in the rate ofinflation
would result in a larger or smaller change in the
nominal rate. In fact, a number of writers on the
determinants of real interest rates have found a
significant negative relationship between the past
rate of inflation and the current real interest rate on
securities. Theirfinding implies that agiven change
in the inflation rate leads to a smaller change in the
nominal rate.
A theoretical argument underlying this empirical
finding is that more rapid inflation leads investors to
want to hold more of their wealth in the form of
tangible capital and less in the form of financial
assets because the nominal returns on capital vary
with the price level whereas the returns on securities
and money are fixed in nominal dollars. This in-
creased demand for capital has the effect ofdriving
up its price and lowering its yield. The shifting of
household savings into residences and the resulting
steep increase in house prices during the 1970s may
have been an example of this phenomenon. More
rapid inflation also lowers the real return to holding
money, because the nominal return on money is
fixed.
9 Finally, since inflation reduces the real rates
ofreturn on both money and capital, the real interest
rate on securities must also decline if investors are
to remain willing to hold the existing stocks of
money and capital. This argument apparently was
first developed by James Tobin'o; hence the result
frequently is called the Tobin effect.
In the years up to 1979, inflation increased sharp-
ly; since that year, it has declined dramatically. The
Tobin effect would predict that real rates would fall
during the 1970s and rise subsequently. Thus, ca-
sual observation of the recent behavior of interest
rates would support Tobin's argument. There may,
however, be other explanations for recent interest
rate movements; and we can sort through them only
by formal econometric testing.
A prominent alternative explanation for these
interest rate movements is that increases in the fed-
eral deficit have tended to drive up real interest
rates. The sharp rise in real rates since 1980 has
coincided with the emergence of federal deficits
which are larger and apparently more long-lasting
than any in recent U.S. history. This does not, of
course, prove that the high rates have been causedby the high deficits. Indeed, the reverse may be the
case because an important source of these deficits
has been a sharp increase in government interest
payments.
11 Nonetheless, a theoretical explanation
ofwhy deficits will drive up interest rates is readily
available. Interest rates must rise in order to induce
the public to hold the government securities which
the Treasury issues when it runs a deficit.
Suppose, for example, the government reduces
tax rates without cutting its outlays. The Treasury
must issue securities to make up for its loss of tax
revenues. Although the tax reduction means that the
public has higher after-tax income, th~ public may
not want to loan all ofthese additional funds to the
Treasury. Hence, the demand for loanable funds by
the government rises by more than the supply of
funds, causing their price-the interest rate-to
rise .12 In slightly different language, the rise in the
interest rate is necessary to induce the public to hold
a larger share of its asset portfolio in the form of
government securities.
Such a tax reduction also leads to an increase in
aggregate demand for goods and services which,
through the familiar Keynesian multiplier process,
causes an increase in nominal national income. This
income effect also will tend to raise interest rates.
At higher income levels the transactions demand to
hold money is greater and ifthis demand for money
is not accommodated by the Federal Reserve, inter-
est rates must rise to restore equilibrium between
the supply of and the demand for money. In addi-
tion, at higher levels of income, businesses may
become more optimistic about the likely future
return on new investment projects and hence more
willing to issue securities in order to finance such
projects. These additional claims on the nation's
capital markets drive interest rates further up. An
analogous argument may be made that an increase
in government outlays will drive up interest rates.
These last arguments frequently are summarized
by saying that interest rates are intluenced by the
high-employment deficit rather than the actual
deficit. The high-employment deficit is a measure
ofthe setting offiscal policy. A more expansionary
fiscal policy-represented by an increase in the
high-employment deficit-tends to raise interest
rates through its effect on current and prospective
future GNP. However, our earlier argument that
actual deficits tend to raise interest rates does not
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depend on their having this effect of raising aggre-
gate demand and hence nominal income. Because
an increase in the actualdeficit must be financed by
the issue ofmore government securities to the pub-
lic, it causes interest rates to be higher at any given
level of GNP. If income does rise, this provides a
second (logically distinct) reason for expecting in-
terest rates to rise. 13
Conversely, the argument that only the high-
employment deficit matters implies that an increase
in the actual deficit which retlects a cyclical decline
in GNP rather than a shift in fiscal policy will not
raise interest rates. This argument ignores the point
that actual deficits-however they arise-must be
financed by the issue of securities and hence cause
interest rates to be higher than they otherwise would
be. In this case, however, the upward pressure on
interest rates associated with this deficit-financing
tends to be offset by the downward pressure from
the decline in GNP.
14
The sharp increase in the federal deficit since
1979 has been widely blamed for the recent high
level ofreal interest rates. It is important, therefore,
for us to test rigorously the hypothesis that, ifother
things remain unchanged, an increase in govern-
ment borrowing causes interest rates to rise. An
obvious empirical problem in this test is that those
other things do not remain unchanged in the actual
world. In particular, the size of the deficit both
affects and is affected by the level ofbusiness activ-
ity in the economy, and this activity in turn intlu-
ences and is intluenced by interest rates.
To distinguish those effects ofdeficits related to
financing by the issue of securities to the public
from those due to the link between deficits and the
level ofincome, we include the gross national prod-
uct relative to potential GNP as an additional vari-
able in the empirical equations estimated below. In
addition, we measure government borrowing as a
proportion of potential GNP in order to adjust for
the long-run growth in the economy and, hence, in
the supplyofprivate savings available to finance the
deficit. The coefficient on the government borrow-
ing variable, therefore, may be interpreted as repre-
senting the effect ofdeficits while holding the level
ofincome constant.
In recent years, high interest payments on the
existing federal debt have boosted the size of the
federal deficit. In fact, the government has beenborrowing in orderto pay interest on its outstanding
debt. A numberofeconomists" have argued that to
the extent that these interest payments result from
high nominal rates caused by inflation, the addi-
tional Treasury borrowing should have no effect on
real rates. Their reason is that inflation reduces the
real value ofgovernment debt outstanding and that
wealth-owners would be willing to purchase addi-
tional securities to maintain the real value of their
stocks ofsecurities with no change in their real rate
ofreturn.
In the empirical work reported below a crude
correction for this effect is made by simply deduct-
ing government interest payments from measured
Treasury borrowing. This deduction is too large
since not all interest payments represent inflation,
but the actual proportion of interest payments that
represent inflation-induced increases in nominal
rates cannot be measured precisely. 16
The upshot of this section is that at any given
level ofGNP, there are reasons to expect real inter-
est rates to be higher ifthe money supply is smaller
in comparison to demand, if the inflation rate is
lower, orifthe governmentdeficit is larger. Eachof
these events has occurred since 1979. Nonetheless,
formal empirical tests are required to determine
which, if any, of these various effects we have
identified was the primary cause of high interest
rates.
Measuring the Real Rate ofInterest
On a given date the real rate of interest on a
security is equal to the nominal rate minus the rate
ofinflation that investors expect to materialize over
the maturity of the security. Put differently, the
nominal rate which is detennined in the financial
markets is equal to the real rate which investors
require exante when they purchase the security plus
the rate ofinflation they expect. Symbolically,
r = i-pc (1)
where r is the real rate, i is the nominal rate and pc is
the expected inflation rate.
17 It was the detennina-
tion ofthis ex ante real rate which the theory ofthe
preceding section sought to explain.
As stressed earlier, the empirical problem with
this fonnulation is that the expected rate ofinflation
is not an observable variable and hence neitheris the
required or ex ante real rate. After the security
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matures, of course, the actual inflation rate be-
comes known and the investorcan calculate the real
rate actually realized. The realized or ex post real
rate is written:
rep = i P (2)
where fP is the ex post real rate and p is the actual
rate ofinflation.
The difference between the ex ante real rate de-
manded by investors when they set the nominal rate
and the expost rate they actually receive is equalto
the error investors made in forecasting inflation. By
substractingequation (1) from equation (2) we find:
reP-r=pc p=u (3)
where u is the error which investors made in their
forecast ofinflation.
To test the various hypotheses advanced in the
last section concerning the determinants of the ex
ante real rate r, we must solve the problemofhaving
data only on the ex post rate, reP. Fortunately, the
theory of efficient markets provides a framework
for attacking this problem.
IR
An efficient market is one in which participants
use all availabl.e information in determining prices.
Since the markets for short-term government secur-
ities are highly competitive, it is generally assumed
that they are efficient in this sense. Participants who
did not take advantage of all available information
would earn lower profits than, and ultimately be
driven out ofbusiness by, competitors who did.
This assumption ofmarketefficiency implies that
when the nominal interest rate is set, investors use
all the infonnation available to them both to deter-
mine the real interest rate they demand and to form
their expectations ofthe future inflation rate. What
this means is that the inflation-forecast error, u, is a
random variable that is independent ofall the other
variables that determine the real rate. It is indepen-
dent because the other variables were necessarily
known when the market setthe nominal rate while u
reflects information that was unknown at that time.
By exploiting this implication ofthe theory ofeffi-
cient markets, we can investigate the determinants
ofthe ex ante real interest rate and test the hypoth-
eses outlined in the previous section, despite the
fact that the ex ante interest rate is not directly
observable.
To illustrate the procedure, let X represent the
factors that theory suggests determine the ex antereal rate and assume that the relation between X and
that rate is a linear one. Then
r a + bX + v (4)
where v is a random errorwhich is independentofX
and essentially captures the variables that affect r
but that have been inadvertently left out ofX.
Combining Equations (3) and (4) gives
{P = a + bX + v + u (5)
The dependent variable in this equation is the ex
postreal rate that is observable. The combinederror
term, v + u, represents both errors in determining
the real rate, v, and errors in predicting inflation, u.
Both of these errors are independent of X so that
least-squares estimation of Equation (5) will yield
unbiased estimates of the parameters of Equation
(4). Notice that although the efficient markets hy-
pothesis implies that u is not autocorrelated, it says
nothing about the characteristics ofv. Hence, in our
empirical work, the combinederrorterm is assumed
to be autocorrelated.
Empirical Results
Equations have been estimated in the form of
Equation (5) for various sample periods. The nomi-
nal interest rate is the average rate on 91-day
Treasury bills, issued in January, April, July and
October, and converted to a bond equivalent basis.
The inflation rate is represented by the annualized
change in the logarithm ofthe consumerprice index
over 3-month spans beginning in those same
months. The dependent variable in the estimated
equations is the ex post real interest rate defined as
the difference between the Treasury bill rate and the
inflation rate. Notice that both the bill rate and the
inflation rate referto non-overlapping time periods.
The vector X was taken to include the following
independent variables: the lagged inflation rate
(PLAG), the excess supply ofmoney (XMONEY),
a measure of the impact of government deficit
spending on credit markets (FEDDEF), and the
ratioofcurrent to potential GNP (INCOME). These
variables are designed to capture the theoretical
considerations outlined earlier.
Lagged inflation refers to the rate ofprice change
over the three-month period ending in the month
preceding the interest rate observation (December,
March, June, and September). Similarly, the other
three variables are quarterly data for the calendar
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quarters ending in those same months. Thus, mar-
ket participants would have had information on
each ofthese four variables when the nominal inter-
est rate was set. For example, when the nominal
interest rate was set in January, investors would
have had information on the rate of inflation over
the three monthsthat ended in December, and data
on the excess supply of money, the government
deficit, and the level ofGNPin the fourth quarterof
the previous year. The variables, therefore, satisfy
the conditions required for the application of the
efficient marketshypothesis.
Our theoretical discussion suggested that an
increase in the expected rate ofinflation will lead to
a decline in the real interest rate. As evidence ofthis
Tobin effect, several authors'9 have found a statis-
tically significant inverse relation between the cur-
rent real interest rate and the past rate of inflation
and have interpreted this finding as evidence ofthis
effect. Although, strictly speaking, the Tobin effect
implies a relationship between the real interest rate
and the expectedfuture inflation rate, it is difficult
to test this hypothesis in the efficient market frame-
work so that lagged inflation is used as a proxy for
expected inflation. We have tried to replicate the
results of these other authors before considering
other possible influences on the real rate suggested
by theory. The relevant equations are shown in
Table I. In an attempt to capture the possible influ-
ence of lagged variables, the error terms in these
equations were assumed to follow a fourth-order
autoregressive process.
The earlier studies generally used a relatively
long sample periodthat encompassed the sixties and
seventies. Hence, it is comforting to find that using
a similar long period-April 1958-0ctober 1979-
we were able to reproduce their conclusion. The
estimated equation shown in the first column of
Table I implies that ifthe quarterly rate ofinflation
increases by one hundred basis points, the real rate
for the succeeding quarter declines 30 basis points,
or, to putthe same point slightly differently, if the
higher inflation rate is expected to continue in the
future, the nominal rate will rise 70 basis points.
Clearly, if this result holds up when the sample
period is extended beyond 1979 and when addi-
tional variables are added to the equation, it will
help to explain why falling inflation rates have been
associated with rising real interest rates.The remaining columns of Table I show the re-
gression results when the long sample period is
divided into two shorter periods-April 1958-
January. 1970 and April 1970-0ctober 1979, and
when the latter period is extended to January 1982.
The first ofthese equations showsonly a small, and
not statistically significant, effectofinflation on the
real rate during the 1958-1970 period. The effect
during the 1970s is larger and highly significant,
implyingthat the negative relationship between in-
flation and the real rate found in other studies (and
apparently confirmed by the results in the first col-
umn), in fact, represents only the experience ofthe
seventies. Given the much lower inflation rate ex-
perienced in the sixties, the result is not surprising.
If there are transactions costs associated with re-
arranging asset portfolios to hold more tangible
assets and fewer financial assets, modest changes in
the inflation rate may not induce any response.
The last column ofTable I shows the estimated
equation when the sample period is extended to
January 1982. Again, the estimates show a negative
relation between inflation and the real rate, sug-
gesting that the Tobin effect continued to hold up
after .the Federal Reserve changed its operating
procedures. This result suggests that the decline in
the rate of inflation after 1979 may have been at
leastpartially responsibleforthe upward movement
inrealrates. However, the structure of the auto-
regressive process on the residuals was sharply
different in this extended sample period, suggesting
that some new variable(s) began toint1uence real
rates after1979,
The theoretical discussion argued that increases
in the supply of money relative to the demand.to
hold it tend to lower interest rates. Our excess
supply ofmoneyvariable is designed to capture this
effect. We derived the variable by, first, estimating
a defil.and formoney equation in which money de-
mand in any quarter depends on current and past
values ofthe interest rate and of nominal personal
income and on the current quarter's increase in
outstanding bank loans. The parameters of this
equation for various sample periods are shown in
Table 2. The inclusion ofthe bank loans variable is
based on the work of Judd and Scadding 20 who
Table 1
Inflation and Real Rates
Periods
Independent Apr 1958- April 1958- Apr 1970-
Variables Oct 1979 Jan 1970 Oct 1979
CONSTANT 0.020 OOIS 0011
(520) (794) (135)
PLAG -0.30 -006 -02S
(517) (079) (119)
RHOI -0.17 -013 -0.21
(163) 1(97) (141)
RH02 0.12 0.05 0.06
(121) «39) <03S)
RH03 030 O.OS 0.29
(290) 1(64) (206)
RH04 0.13 -o.n 0.31
(125) (174) (211 )
R-SQUARED 0.395 O.OS 034
















RHOI. RH02. RH03. RH04 are fourth orderautocorrelation coefficients.
39argue that when banks increase their lending, mem-
byrsofthe public receive additional bank deposits
(money), some of which they are willing to hold
temporarily until they rearrange their portfolios to
add to their earning assets. Thus, the demand to
holdiffioney also depends On recent increases in
banklending.
In· a given quarter, the demand to·hold money
may rise as a result of past or present increases in
personal income or as the delayed result ofpast
declinesin interest rates. Ifsuch a rise in dernarid is
not .matched by a corresponding increase in the
supply of money, the interest rate must rise tore-
store equilibrium in the market. Since members of
the public do not adjust their money-holdings in-
stantanously, this interest-rate change may be
spread over severaLmonths. Similarly, to the extent
that there is a rise inthestockofmoneyas aresultof
an addition to the volume ofbank lending, therise
will tendtodrive downinterestratesinlatermonths
because members ofthe public are only willing to
hold this additional moneytemporarily.
To capture these effects of money oninterest
rates, the estimated coefficients ofthe money de-
mandequation are usedtopredictwhatthequantity
ofmoney demandedin a given quarter wouldhave
beenifthe interest ratehadremainedthesame as the
preceding quarterand iftherehadbeen no change in
Table 2
Quarterly Demand for Money Equations
















































*Coefficients are sums offour-quarter distributed lags.
**Coefficient is sum ofeight-quarterdistributed lag.
TIME DUMMY O. 1956(4) - 1974(3);
= 1.2.3...8. 1974(4) 1976(3)
= 8 1976(4) 1982(4)
Thedummy variable is raised to the second. thirdand fourth powers to allow the implicitconstant tem1 in the equation to vary smoothly.
RHO = First Order Auto Regression Parameter
40the volume of bank loans. The difference between
this quantity and the actual supply ofmoney is the
excess supply ofmoney, XMONEy'
21 Increases in
this variable are expected to be associated with
declinesin the interest rate inthe sUbsequent month.
Notice that because the demand for money is made
to depend on nominal income, this variablecaptures
the effect ofchanges in income on interest rates via
the transactions demandfor money.
Two alternative measures ofFEDDEF, the vari-
able representing the impactofgovernment borrow-
ing on credit markets, were used: the overall federal
government deficit shown in the national income
and product accounts and the total of government
and agency securities issued to the public (exclud-
ing the Federal Reserve system). Each variable was
deflated by potential GNP and each was measured
both inclusive and exclusive of Treasury interest
payments. The second variable, which measures
more directly the impactoffederal borrowing on the
credit markets, fit the data slightly betteL For this
reason, only equations using the second definition
ofthis variable are reported below.
The final variable in the estimated equation is the
level of GNP relative to potential. This variable
captures any effect on interest rates ofcyclical vari-
ations in real income in addition to those operating
throughthe transactions demand for money. Also, it
enables us to interpret the coefficient on FEDDEF
as representing only the effect offinancing changes
Table 3
Determinants of Real Interest Rates
Periods
Independent
Variables Ap~1~~l! - Jan 1970 Apr 1970 - Oct 1979 Apr 19!()~::: Jan 1982
CONSTANT 0.148 0.149 0.089 0.092 0.550 0.572
(181 ) (182) (()63) (0.66) (1.(2) (1(9)
PLAG 0213 0216 -0 113 -0.101 0362 0..169
(185) (188) (110) (097) (213) (2.17)
FEDDEFI 0.141 0369 o.on
(110) (In) (0090)
FEDDEF2 0.137 (un -(l.OII
(1(9) (1.78) (CUB8)
XMONEY -1006 -1006 --0 168 ~O.147 1368 1380
(3.23) (3.23) (0 175) (0.15) (1.70) (1.72)
INCOME ·-0.134 -O.U.1 -0.104 -0.102 -0.576 -0600
(158) (157) (on) (072) (1(3) (1(9)
RHOI 0.083 0.086 -0.112 -0.105 O.7U 0.716
(063) (().65) (0.76) «(UI) (450)
RH02 0250 0248 0005 0.002 -0. -0.150
(194) (193) (U9) (()Ol) (()80) (082)
RHO-' o 178 0.177 0.307 (um 0.387 (U85
(lAO) (1.39) (2AO) (2.36) (2.11 ) (2.09)
RH04 -0.178 -0.178 OA.10 OA26 -0.055 -0059
(IAI) (141) (3 II) (3.08) (0.33) (0..16)
0.17 0.18 0..16 0..16 OA8 0.48
FEDDEF! includes and FEDDEF2 excludes government interest payments.
41in the deficit, holding the level ofincome constant.
An increase in real income tends to raise the antici-
pated return on real assets because businesses be-
come more optimistic. This will tend to drive up
interestrates as businesses seek to borrow to finance
capital investment. At the same time, however, the
supply of savings typically rises during a business
cycle upswing and mitigates the upward pressure on
interest rates. Thus, the sign of the coefficient on
the.INCOME variable is not determinate on the
basis ofeconomic theory.
Table 3 shows the results of adding these three
variables to the equations estimated in Table I.
Since the INCOME variable is defined as the ratio
ofactual to potential GNP it is equal to one when the
economy is operating at potential. Hence, the esti-
mated value ofthe interest rate when the economy is
at full employment and when there is no inflation,
no federal borrowing and no excess money is repre-
sented by the sum of the constant term and the
coefficient on the INCOME variable. This value
was close to Ilf2 percent in the sixties and was
negative in the seventies. Over the 1970-82 sample
period, this value was even more negative-
between - 21 /2 and - 31 / 2 percent, implying that the
high real rates actually observed were associated
with changes in one or more of the independent
variables in the equation and not with a shift in the
intercept.
Both in the 1960s and in the 1970s, the coeffi-
cient on government borrowing is estimated to be
positive. Thus, as theory would suggest, increases
in federal borrowing at given levels ofincome were
associated with higher real interest rates. The effect
was smaller-and not statistically significant-in
the earlier sample period when government borrow-
ing was much smaller relative to the size of the
economy. These results are hardly affected when
government interest payments are excluded from
total government borrowing. Apparently interest
rates were influenced by total government borrow-
ing, regardless of whether the funds were used to
make interest payments on earlier borrowings. This
result casts somedoubt on the argument that deficits
caused by high nominal Treasury interest payments
do not drive up the real rate.
The last two columns of Table 3 display the
results of extending the sample period to January
1982. Despite the widespread belief that the high
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levels ofreal interest rates after 1979 were the result
ofthe sharp increase in federal borrowing, the co-
efficients on FEDDEF in these equations are small
and insignificant. Thus, statistical analysis does not
confirm the popularview that high real interestrates
in recent years have been due to the increased vol-
ume ofTreasury borrowingY
A similar lack ofstability in the coefficients was
found with respect to the inflation and money
variables. As the first column of Table 3 shows,
during the 1958-1970 period, increases in the excess
supply ofmoney had a strongly negative impact on
real interest rates: This is the result which tradi-
tional Keynesian liquidity-preference theory would
predict.
In the subsequent decade, changes in monetary
conditions had no perceptible influence on real
rates. The estimated coefficient on XMONEY in
the second column ofTable 3, although negative, is
small and not statistically significant. The most
plausible explanation ofthis result is that it reflects
the growing recognition by the public ofthe role of
money in the inflation process. As investors come
to realize that increases in the money supply lead to
higher prices and, if sustained, to faster inflation,
the net effect ofmonetary changes on interest rates
becomes ambiguous.
Increases in the inflation rate were associated
with increases in the real rate during the first sample
period. Our analysis ofthe Tobin effect would lead
us to expect the contrary. Until 1965, however, the
average inflation rate was very low so that changes
in the rate may not have led the public to alter its
inflation expectations. Hence, increases in PLAG
may have captured the effect of increases in the
level of prices, which tend to raise interest rates
when the money stock is held constant, rather than
of increases in the expected inflation rate, which
tend to lower real rates via the Tobin effect. During
the 1970s, however, the estimated equation indi-
cates that increases in the inflation rate were associ-
ated with higher nominal but lower real rates, as the
Tobin effect would predict. However, this result is
not significant at conventional probability levels
when the influences of other variables are incor-
porated into the equation.
When the sample period is extended beyond Oc-
tober 1979, the estimated coefficients both on
PLAG and on XMONEY are significantly positive.Real rates rose when either the inflation rate in-
creased orthe supply ofmoney grew faster than the
demand. Since this extended period was one in
which the Federal Reserve was strictly limiting
money growth with a view to ending inflation, this
result__which doesnot accordwiththepredictions
of standard macroeconomic theory__suggests sec-
urity markets. interpreted increases in eithermoney
growth or inflation as signals ofimpending tighten-
ingofpolicy·bytheFed; interestrates consequently
rose. As previously indicated,the Treasury's bor-
ro\Ving had no significant impact on the real rate
during this period when the effects ofinflation and
monetary policy were controlled for.
Summaryand Conclusion
In recent years, real interest rates have risen
sharply. It is widely argued that the need to finance
increasing government deficits combined with a
tight monetary policy on the part of the Federal
Reserve System have been the principal reason for
this development. In this paper, the formal theory
underlying these arguments has been explained.
This theory also suggests that a reduction in the rate
of inflation will be associated with increased real
rates.
An inescapable problem in testing hypotheses
about the real·interest rate is that when the market
sets the nominal interest rate, it doesSa on the basis
of an expected rate of inflation. Wealth-holders
determine the nominal interest rate by adding their
expected inflation rate to the exante real rate which
theydemand. However, the outside observerofthe
marketcannot measure this exante rate; he can only
measure the expost rate that emerges. Nonetheless,
by making use ofthe theory ofefficient markets, it
is possible to test hypotheses about the determinants
ofthe exante rate using data on the expostrate.
A numberofstudies by other authors havefound
that there was a significant inverse relationship in
the post-warperiodbetween the rate ofinflation and
the real rate. Since the inflation rate has fallen since
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1979, this relationship-if it continued to hold-
would imply that real rates should have risen. How-
ever, the empirical results ofthis papersuggest that
this relation only held during the seventies and that
even during this decade the effect was less signifi-
cant when onetook accountofchange in the money
supply and the federal deficit that took place at the
same time.
Higher levels of federal borrowing were associ-
atedwith increases in real rates during thel970s.
However, the empirical results do not support the
proposition that there is any simple direct causal
link betweenthe recent sharp increase in the federal
deficit and high real rates. In the equation estimated
for the period between April 1970 and January
1982, for example, the estimated coefficienton the
federal borrowing variable is small and not statisti-
cally significant. In fact, this equation suggests that
money shocks and changes in the inflation rate have
been more closely related to real rates than has the
federal deficit. However, in this period high rates
were. associated with high inflation and positive
monetary shocks rather than the reverse, probably
because these factors were interpreted as signals of
likely Federal Reserve policy in the near future.
Thus, the statistical analysis in this paper of the
various factors which economic theory and popular
opinion suggest as possible causes ofthe post-1979
rise in real rates does not strongly confirm anyone
ofthem. The results suggestthat there is agreatdeal
more to be learned before we fully understand the
causes ofthe explosion in real rates.
A situation in which a substantial portion ofgov-
ernment outlays are financed by borrowing rather
than by taxation is unprecedented in peacetime.
Hence, we should not be surprised that econometric
analysis ofdata from an earlier period fails to pro-
vide a good. guide to the current situation. This
suggests that in formulating policy, we should be
guided by the predictions ofeconomic theory even
though that theory has yet to be confirmedby empir-
ical evidence.FOOTNOTES
1. Throughout this paper, yields are measured on a bond-
equivalentbasis in ordertomakethemconsistentwith rates
of inflation.
2,Holdersof Treasury Bills pay attention to the inflation rate
they expect to occur over the maturity of the bill. Chart 1
shows the inflation rate which actuallyoccurred, Over long
periods, however, the rate of inflation which investors ex-
pect should not diverge too far from the actual rate. Hence
the realized real return on bills should be a good proxy for
the real rate which their holders anticipated,
3. The readerwill recognize this argument as a simplified
form of the expectations theory of the term structure of
interest rates,
4, Forone attempt to measure real long-term interest rates,
see Charles Pigott, "Measuring Real Interest Rates Using
the Term Structure and Exchange Rates," in a forthcoming
issue ofthe Economic Review.
5. Notice that both the supply and the demand refer to the
stock of securities. However, if these stock supplies and
demands are equal at two successive dates, then the new
securities issued between these dates must have been
willingly purchased by investors. Some economists, and
most market commentators, prefer to think of the interest
rate as equating the flow of new issues by borrowers with
thedemand by investorsto add totheirholdingsofsecurities.
6, J.M, Keynes, The General Theory of Employment,
Interest & Money, New York, Harcourt Brace &Company,
1936, (p. 167),
7, Fora moredetailed exposition of this argumentsee John
P, Judd and John L. Scadding, "Liability Management,
Bank Loans and Deposit 'Market' Disequilibrium," Eco-
nomic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
Summer 1981.
8, Ifnominal interestincomes aretaxable, nominal rates will
rise proportionately more than inflation, since investors will
demand that their after-tax real incomes be protected
againstthe effects of rising prices,
9. Notice thatthe deregulation of interest rates on monetary"
assets may weaken this effect in the future,
10. For an exposition of the argument in the context of a
complete model of asset markets, see James Tobin, "A
General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory," Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 1, Number 1,
(February 1969).
11. In the 1982 fiscal year the federal government had an
overall deficit of $123.9 billion, while net interest payments
were $82.5 billion.
12, Some economists have argued that as long as govern-
ment outlays have not changed, members of the public will
recognize that a cut in their currenttax liabilities will have to
be offset by an increase in their (or their children's) future
tax liabilities. Thus, they will not change their level of con-
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sumption and will be willing to invest their increased sav-
ings in securities in order to provide for those future tax
liabilities, Hence the supply of loanable funds increases by
as much as the demand so that the.interest rate is unaf-
fected, David Ricardo was an early exponent of this view
so that economists who take this position are frequently
described as neo-Ricardians. Although there is some em-
pirical evidence for this position, most economists believe
the argument assumes a greater degree of rationality and
farsightedness than most households possess, For an ex-
tensive discussion of this issue, see Robert J. Barro, "Are
Government Bonds Net Wealth," Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 82, No, 6 (1974),
13. In terms of the traditionallS/LM paradigm, the increase
in the interest rate which results from the expansionary
effect of an increase in the high employment deficit on
nominal income is represented by an upward shift of the IS
curve, The increase which results from the fact that actual
deficits must be financed by the issue ofsecurities is repre-
sented by an upward shiftof the LM curve. The publicwill be
willing to hold a larger share of its portfolio in the form of
securities (and hence a smaller share in the form of money
or physical capital) only if interest rates on securities rise.
For an early explanation of this distinction see William L.
Silber, "Fiscal Policy in IS-LM Analysis: A Correction."
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. II (November
1970), More extensive discussions of the role of govern-
ment deficits are provided in L.H, Mayer, "The Balance
Sheet Identity, the Government Financing Constraint and
the.CrOWding-Out Effect," Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics Vol. 1 (January 1975) and Brian Motley, Money,
Income and Wealth, Lexington, Mass: D,C. Heath and
Co., 1977. Chapter 6.
14. An exogenous cyclical downturn is represented by a
downward shift of the IS curve, which, by itself, tends to
10Vl/er interest rates. The upward pressure on rates caused
by the associated rise in the deficit to be financed is repre-
sented by an upward shift of the LM curve, Hence, the net
effect on interest rates cannot be predicted a priori on the
basis ofeconomic theory.
15. Adrian W. Throop, "Changing Fiscal Policy II," Weekly
Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, January
16,1981. Brian Horrigan and Aris Protopapadakis, "Fed-
eral Deficits: A Faulty Gauge of Government's Impact on
Financial Markets," Business Review, Federal Reserve
BankofPhiladelphia, MarchiApril 1982,
16. Forone attemptto measure the effect of inflation on the
Treasury's interest-costs, see Throop, op. cit. An alterna-
tive approach which directly measures the decline in the
real value of the government debt, is used by Horrigan and
Protopapadakis, op, cit.
17, This formulation assumes that investors are risk neutral
and hence do not require a risk premium to cover the fact
that the inflation rate is uncertain,18. Fora detailed exposition of this argument, see Fred-
erick S. Mishkin, "The Real Interest Rate: An Empirical
Investigation:' Carnegie-Rochester.Conference Series
on Public Policy, 15, (1981).
19. See, forexample, Frederick S. Mishkin, op. cit., John H.
Makin, "Real Interest, Money Surprises and Anticipated
Inflation:' W?rking Paper 878, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, (December 1981).
20. John P. Judd and John L. Scadding, op. cit.
21. The stock ofmoney in a given quarter t may be written
MS
t at + blNCOMEt +cINTEREST RATEt
+dLiBKLOANSt + et
where ilt includes the effects of all lagged variables on
money demand as well as the constant term, and et is the
residual between the actual money stock and the fitted
money demand. Then
XMONEYt MSt - (at + b INCOMEt +
clNTEREST RATEt-1) = c (INTEREST RATEt
INTERESTRATE t_ 1) + dLiBKLOANS + et
22. This result does not, however, mean that real rates
would not have been lower if fiscal policy had been less
expansionary, but only that-given the level of nominal
income which resulted from that policy-the additional im-
pact on interest rates ofthe associated deficits was small.
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